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Abstract
Cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guar-
antees and intergovernmental transfer schemes. This paper explores whether such
features of cooperative federations lead to subnational soft budget constraints using
panel data from the German States covering the 1975-2005 period. The methodology
is based on the premise that subnational governments’ borrowing will exhibit vertical
and horizontal strategic interactions if they operate under soft budget constraints.
Therefore, a test for strategic interactions in subnational borrowing can be used to
infer whether a cooperative federation like Germany is susceptible to soft budget con-
straints. The results suggest that state borrowing in Germany exhibited horizontal
but not vertical interactions during the time-frame of the analysis. This indicates
(i) that German States faced soft budget constraints and (ii) that they were more
concerned about the likelihood of a bailout than about its volume.
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The ﬁscal federalism literature distinguishes two types of federations. Countries where
subnational governments possess substantial tax autonomy, where revenues are not shared,
and little ﬁscal equalization takes place are called competitive federations. In cooperative
federations, on the other hand, subnational tax autonomy tends to be low, revenues are
usually shared, considerable ﬁscal equalization takes place, and im- or explicit bailout
guarantees are often given (Schaltegger and Feld, 2009).
These two types of federations lead to diﬀerent incentives for policy makers. Con-
sequently, they will have diﬀerent implications for macroeconomic and ﬁscal outcomes
(Weingast, 2009). One criticism leveled against cooperative systems of federalism in recent
years is that they are much more susceptible to subnational over-borrowing. This asser-
tion is primarily founded on case studies which show that cooperative federations such as
Argentina (Dillinger and Webb, 1999), Brazil (Samuels, 2003), and Germany (Seitz, 1999)
have experienced considerably more problems with subnational debt than competitive fed-
erations like Switzerland (Feld and Kirchg¨ assner, 2007) and the United States (Inman,
2003).
These case studies suggest that lower-level jurisdictions in cooperative federations have
an incentive to over-borrow because of soft budget constraints. In federal ﬁscal relations,
soft budget constraints can emerge if subnational governments expect that some of the costs
of their borrowing will eventually be paid for by the federal government. It has been argued
in the literature that federal governments in cooperative federations are more likely to bail
out an indebted jurisdiction than those in competitive federations (Blankart and Klaiber,
2006). Indeed, it is a reasonable conjecture that once schools and police departments
have to be closed due to subnational over-borrowing, calls for a federal intervention will
be more pronounced in cooperative than in competitive federations because of diﬀering
2expectations regarding the responsibilities of the federation. In particular, the existence
of an extensive ﬁscal equalization scheme signals to all states that the federation has the
institutional means and the political will to bail out an indebted jurisdiction.1
One methodological approach put forward in the literature to test whether the soft bud-
get constraints problem and thus subnational over-borrowing is more prevalent in coopera-
tive federations than in competitive ones is to simply regress a measure for the indebtedness
of the public sector on a measure for the importance of contemporaneous intergovernmental
transfers. The underlying idea behind this approach is that the importance of intergovern-
mental transfers is a reasonable proxy for the competitiveness of a federation. In general,
studies using this approach, e.g. De Mello (2000), Rodden (2002), and Baskaran (2010),
ﬁnd that cooperative federations do not systematically borrow more than competitive ones.
However, one problem with the methodological approach advanced in these studies is
that they do not test the soft budget constraints argument properly. According to the
theoretical literature on soft budget constraints, the reason for their emergence are expected
future transfers that are paid to alleviate the costs associated with a large debt burden,
not contemporaneous transfers. Therefore, contemporaneous transfers are at best only an
imperfect proxy for bailout expectations, and at worst an incorrect one.
Due to this methodological problem, a second strand of the empirical literature focuses
on individual countries and explores whether speciﬁc institutional features within a country
lead to soft budget constraints.2 In this paper, I follow this strand of the literature and
1By now, there are also several theoretical contributions suggesting that bailout guarantees
and the possibility of discretionary transfers lead to ﬁscal distortions. See for example Wildasin
(1997), Qian and Roland (1998), Goodspeed (2002), Doi and Ihori (2006), Akai and Sato (2008),
Crivelli and Staal (2008), and Breuill´ e and Vigneault (2010).
2For example, Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg (2005) argue that for local communities in Sweden,
past bailouts provide information regardingthe likelihood of future bailouts. Using an instrumental variable
approach, they ﬁnd that bailout expectations have a strong causal eﬀect on local debt. Rodden (2000)
studies state borrowing in Germany. He argues that the structure of ﬁscal equalization in Germany
induces bailout expectations in the states that are net-recipients during horizontal equalization, but not in
the states that are net-payers. He then shows that net-recipient states are slower in adjusting their ﬁscal
policies to adverse ﬁscal shocks than net-paying states. Based on this ﬁnding, he concludes that bailout
3explore whether speciﬁc features of the ﬁscal constitution prevailing in the Federal Republic
of Germany have led to subnational soft budget constraints during the 1975-2005 period.
The methodology used in this paper is based on the premise that subnational borrow-
ing in cooperative federations should be characterized by vertical and horizontal strategic
interactions if subnational governments face soft budget constraints. In other words, if
a state expects that it will receive a bailout once it faces a severe ﬁscal crisis, then its
contemporaneous borrowing should react systematically to the borrowing of the federal
government (vertical interactions) and/or to the borrowing of other member states of the
federation (horizontal interactions).
Why should bailout guarantees lead to vertical strategic interactions in subnational bor-
rowing? If the federal government cannot commit to a no-bailout policy, every subnational
government has an incentive to increase borrowing. The magnitude of this incentive, how-
ever, will depend on the expected amount of resources the federal government will have
at its disposal when a bailout becomes necessary. If there is reason to suspect that the
federal government will have fewer resources in the future because of its own borrowing,
subnational incentives to over-borrow will be, ceteris paribus, less pronounced, and vice
versa.
Horizontal strategic interactions may emerge for two reasons. First, higher transfers to
other subnational jurisdictions imply lower transfers for one’s own jurisdiction as long as
federal resources are ﬁnite. This means that if other jurisdictions over-borrow, the available
resources for a bailout for one’s own jurisdiction will be reduced. Second, the decision of
whether or not to grant a bailout to a given subnational jurisdiction will be made not only
based on its own debt burden but also based on that in other subnational jurisdictions.
Usually, a jurisdiction has to prove that it faces extraordinary ﬁscal diﬃculties before it
will receive a bailout. If all jurisdictions exhibit a high debt burden, it is diﬃcult for any
expectations lead to less sound ﬁscal policies. However, one problematic feature of his study is that the
methodology relies on the assumption that only net-recipient states operate under soft budget constraints.
4individual jurisdiction to argue that it is extraordinarily needy. Hence, each subnational
government has to take the borrowing in other jurisdictions into account when optimally
determining its own borrowing policy.3
For these reasons, it can be expected that subnational borrowing in cooperative feder-
ations will be characterized by vertical and horizontal interactions if subnational govern-
ments operate under soft budget constraints. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this line of
reasoning applies to Germany, an archetypical cooperative federation. Decisions regarding
whether or not a state should receive a federal bailout have been made in Germany by
the federal constitutional court. Relying on a number of constitutional stipulations (in
particular, Art. 72 , Art. 106, and Art. 107) which demand that equal living conditions
have to be guaranteed throughout the federation, the court granted two states, Saarland
and Bremen, a bailout in 1992.4 In determining whether the debt levels in Bremen and
Saarland necessitate a federal bailout, the constitutional court compared the debt to GDP
ratio and the ﬁscal burden caused by the interest payments in these two states with that
in all other German states.
This ruling by the constitutional court hence made explicit what subnational policy
makers in Germany have in all likelihood already known implicitly: that the probability
of a state receiving a bailout depends not only on its own borrowing, but also on the
borrowing of all other states. The ruling also underscored that the likelihood of another
state receiving a bailout depends on any given state’s borrowing insofar as it aﬀects the
average debt burden of the subnational tier. Moreover, it implicitly aﬃrmed that the ﬁscal
situation of the federal government will aﬀect decisions regarding subnational bailouts.
It is consequently a reasonable conjecture that the borrowing polices of the constituent
3Note that the theoretical models developed by Wildasin (1997), Goodspeed (2002),
Breuill´ e and Vigneault (2010), and Akai and Sato (2008) also suggest that bailout expectations will
lead to vertical and horizontal strategic interactions in ﬁscal policy.
4Even though the constitutional court declined to provide a bailout to the state of Berlin in 2006, it
did so on the grounds that Berlin was not “indebted enough” to require a bailout. In fact, it reaﬃrmed in
this ruling that a subnational debt burden that is “too high” should lead to a bailout (H¨ ade, 2007).
5members of the German federation, i.e. the states and the federal government, are inter-
dependent and will exhibit strategic interactions if some or all states operate under soft
budget constraints.
In this paper, therefore, I empirically study whether the borrowing in a given German
State reacts to the borrowing of other member states of the federation and/or to the
borrowing of the federal government in order to establish whether subnational governments
in Germany operate under soft budget constraints. More speciﬁcally, I estimate linear
models where the dependent variable is the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i in year t and
the main independent variables are (i) the weighted average5 deﬁcit to GDP ratio of the
“other” states in the federation and (ii) the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of the federal government.
Since OLS does not produce consistent estimates in models with such ﬁscal policy in-
teractions, I rely on the instrumental variable approach to identify the eﬀect of the other
states’ weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the federal government’s deﬁcit to GDP
ratio on the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of a given state i. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any
natural-experiment type mechanism that induces truly exogenous variation in the endoge-
nous variables. Therefore, I use a set of instruments for which I argue below that they are
likely to be robust to certain sources of endogeneity. However, since I cannot rule out all
possible sources of endogeneity ex-ante, I also present a set of robustness checks in order
to explore to what extent the results are driven by each of the instruments.
I use the other states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio and their weighted
average contemporaneous population growth as instruments for their weighted average
deﬁcit to GDP ratio. As instruments for the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of the federal government,
I use a dummy variable indicating federal election years and a dummy variable indicating
the ideology of the federal government.
5I consider four diﬀerent weighting schemes. See section 3.2 for more details.
6The lagged and contemporaneous deﬁcits of other states will be related if there is some
persistence in deﬁcits. The reason to expect a strong relationship between the other states’
population growth and their deﬁcits is that population size is the most important determi-
nant of the amount of equalization transfers a state receives during horizontal and vertical
equalization in Germany. An increase in population size will therefore lead to higher
revenues and consequently to smaller deﬁcits in any given state. A relationship between
federal deﬁcits and federal election years can emerge if the federal government adjusts
deﬁcits in view of federal elections. Similarly, it is also a reasonable conjecture that there
are ideological diﬀerences in the borrowing policies of the federal government.6
In addition to being strongly related to the endogenous variables, the instruments should
also be uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regressions in order to produce
reliable estimates. One reason to suspect such a correlation in the current context is reverse
causality between the deﬁcit of a state i and the population growth in other states. Such
reverse causality may emerge if inhabitants migrate in view of state deﬁcits. However, the
execution of a decision to migrate, even if it is based on deﬁcits, will take time. Therefore,
even though this instrument may not be strictly exogenous, it appears to be feasible to
treat it as pre-determined. Nonetheless, I present in section 4.3 a robustness check where
the baseline models are re-estimated after omitting the other states’ weighted average
6I estimate least squares dummy variable (LSDV) and Anderson-Hsiao models in the empirical section.
In the ﬁrst stage regressions for the LSDV models, the other states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to
GDP ratio generally displays, as expected, a signiﬁcantly positive correlation with their contemporaneous
weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio. The weighted average of the other states’ population growth is
generally signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with their weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio, which
is expected as well. I also ﬁnd in the ﬁrst stage regressions for the LSDV models that right-wing federal
governments have borrowed signiﬁcantly more than left-wing federal governments and that federal deﬁcits
have been signiﬁcantly lower in election years. In the Anderson-Hsiao models, I use both ﬁrst diﬀerences
and further lags of the other states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio and weighted average
population growth to instrument the ﬁrst diﬀerences of their contemporaneous weighted average deﬁcit to
GDP ratio. These instruments are signiﬁcantly related to the endogenous variable, but because both ﬁrst
diﬀerences and lags of the instruments are simultaneously included, the signs of the coeﬃcients cannot be
as easily interpreted as for the LSDV models. For the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio,
I use ﬁrst diﬀerences of the federal ideology and election dummies as instruments in the Anderson-Hsiao
models. For these instruments, the ﬁrst stage regressions in the Anderson-Hsiao models are similar to
those in the LSDV models.
7population growth from the instrument set to explore to what extent the baseline results
rely on the validity of this particular instrument.
This kind of reverse-causality is implausible for the lagged weighted average deﬁcit to
GDP ratio of other states since there cannot be an eﬀect of the deﬁcit of state i in period t
on the deﬁcits of other states in t-1. However, it is possible that this variable has a direct
eﬀect on the deﬁcit of a state i if states react with some lag to each others’ borrowing. Since
I cannot exclude this possibility ex-ante, I explore in section 4.3 to what extent the baseline
results change when this variable is explicitly included in the second stage regressions.
Reversed causality between state deﬁcits and the federal election and ideology dummies
is implausible as well because the deﬁcit of any particular state i is unlikely to have an
eﬀect on the timing or on the outcome of federal elections. However, these variables may
have a direct eﬀect on state i’s deﬁcits if some states receive ﬁscal beneﬁts from a politically
aligned federal government or if they adjust their ﬁscal policy in view of federal elections.
Consequently, in line with the procedure for the other states’ lagged weighted average
deﬁcit to GDP ratio, I explore the robustness of the results to including these instruments
in the second stage regressions in section 4.3.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I brieﬂy discuss the
federal system and the evolution of subnational debt in Germany. In section 3, I derive the
empirical speciﬁcation for testing whether strategic interactions in subnational borrowing
exist and describe the data. In section 4, I report the results. They suggest the presence of
positive horizontal strategic interactions. However, while this ﬁnding is consistent with the
existence of soft budget constraints, subnational borrowing in Germany might exhibit hor-
izontal strategic interactions for other reasons than soft budget constraints. In particular,
if voters use the borrowing in other states as yardstick to evaluate the performance of their
own state governments, every state government might have an incentive to react strategi-
cally to other states’ borrowing, a mechanism that is referred to as yardstick competition
8(Salmon, 1987). Thus, section 5 explores whether the horizontal strategic interactions can
be explained by yardstick competition or whether soft budget constraints are indeed the
most likely explanation. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the ﬁndings.
2 Fiscal federalism in Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany is founded on strong federalist principles. It consists
of three tiers of government: federal (Bund), state (L¨ ander), and local (Gemeinden). The
localities, however, are with respect to ﬁscal matters subordinate to the states. The im-
portant protagonists for the purposes of this paper are therefore the federal and state
governments.
Until the uniﬁcation of West-Germany with the former GDR in October 1990, the Ger-
man federation consisted of eleven states.7 Uniﬁcation took the form of an admittance of
ﬁve recreated states on the territory of the former GDR into the federation. Simultane-
ously, West- and East-Berlin were merged into a single city-state. The number of states
hence increased to sixteen. Three of these are city-states, comprising only one city: Berlin,
Bremen, and Hamburg.
The federal tier has more legislative power in Germany than in the US or Canada
(Watts and Hobson, 2000). However, the states have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on federal leg-
islation. All federal laws that have ﬁnancial consequences for the states need majority
support in the Bundesrat, i.e. the second chamber of parliament where state governments
are organized. For all other legislation, the Bundesrat has a suspensive veto.8
7The city-state of West-Berlin had a special position since the western allies were formally responsible
for its administration. However, it was de facto the eleventh state of West-Germany.
8The Bundesrat consists of representatives of the state governments, usually the ﬁrst minister and
other senior state ministers. The number of votes allocated to each state depends positively on the size
of the population. Votes are, however, not proportional to population size. Less populous states have
a disproportionately large share of votes. The number of votes can vary over time, depending on the
development of the population.
9Subnational expenditures are largely ﬁnanced through tax revenues, transfers, and debt.
In general, state governments are free to borrow. There is a nominal rule-based borrowing
restriction for the federal and state tier, but it has been widely criticized as ineﬀective.9
That it has indeed not prevented the persistent growth of subnational debt, can be inferred
from ﬁgure 1 where the debt to GDP ratio of the subnational tier is plotted over time.
This ﬁgure reveals that the debt to GDP ratio of the subnational tier has increased from
just over 10% to around 25% between 1975 and 2005.
Figures 2 and 3 show that, ﬁrst, all states have displayed on average positive deﬁcits over
the 1975-2005 period. Thus, all states have contributed to the accumulation of subnational
debt in Germany. Second, these ﬁgures also reveal that the aggregated deﬁcits of the
subnational sector have been positive in every year, even though there is some over-time
variation. While deﬁcits have on average declined until the nineties, they sharply rose after
1990, then steadily declined until 2000, only to increase again thereafter.
While state governments possess signiﬁcant expenditure and borrowing autonomy, they
have almost no tax autonomy.10 There are four types of taxes in Germany: federal, state,
local, and shared taxes. Taxes designated as federal, state, or local accrue exclusively
to the respective tier of government. The most important shared taxes are the income,
value added, and the corporate tax. The revenue from these taxes constitutes around
three-quarters of total tax revenue. Their rates and bases are determined at the federal
level in negotiations between the federal and subnational governments and are harmonized
between all states, i.e. rates and bases are the same throughout the federation.
9The current borrowing restriction is the so called “golden rule” which stipulates that deﬁcits may
not be larger than investments. However, it is fairly easy to bypass this rule. For example, it is diﬃcult
to distinguish capital and current expenditures. Moreover, the rule can be legally broken if the ﬁnance
minister declares that there is a serious disruption of the macroeconomic equilibrium. It is therefore
not surprising that this rule has not prevented the continuous growth of subnational debt in the last
few decades. However, Germany is currently involved in a major reform of its ﬁscal constitution. One
important aspect of this reform is the introduction of a new borrowing restriction in 2011 that is supposedly
stricter than the current golden rule.
10See Watts and Hobson (2000) and Federal Ministry of Finance (2009) for detailed surveys of Ger-
many’s system of ﬁscal federalism.
10The shared taxes are ﬁrst distributed according to a pre-speciﬁed formula between the
federal and subnational tiers.11 The share of the income tax revenues accruing to the states
is allocated among the individual states according to the residence principle (revenues
accrue to the state in which the taxed person lives). The states’ share of the corporate tax
revenues is allocated according to the principle of permanent establishment (tax revenues
from taxing a company’s commercial unit accrue to the state in which that commercial unit
is located). 75% of the states’ share of the revenues from the value added tax are allocated
on a per-capita basis. The remaining 25% are used to increase the ﬁscal capacities of those
states that have below average per-capita revenues after the allocation of the revenues
from the state and shared taxes. Hence, the sharing rule for the value added tax already
equalizes revenues between states and is therefore referred to as the ﬁrst leg of the federal
equalization system.
After the ﬁscal ﬂows during the primary allocation of shared taxes, intergovernmental
transfers are paid to explicitly equalize ﬁscal capacities among the states. First, revenues
ﬂow from ﬁscally strong to ﬁscally weak states. This stage is referred to as horizontal equal-
ization (L¨ anderﬁnanzausgleich) because the federal government is not involved. The exact
deﬁnition of what constitutes a ﬁscally strong or a ﬁscally weak state is complicated, but,
in general, states that have above-average per-capita revenues after the primary allocation
of tax revenues are considered to be ﬁscally strong and vice versa.
The second stage of equalization consists of various vertical transfers from the federal
government to the states. First, all ﬁscally weak states receive general-purpose transfers
in order to increase their ﬁscal capacities further. In addition, vertical transfers are also
paid to certain ﬁscally weak states to reimburse them for speciﬁc expenditure needs.
11Because the localities are considered to be part of the states for ﬁscal purposes, I only focus on the
federal and state governments in the following even though the localities receive a small fraction of the
revenues from the shared taxes.
11Finally, there are explicit bailout transfers (Sanierungs-Bundeserg¨ anzungszuweisungen)
that can be paid by the federal government to highly indebted states in order to help them
reduce their debt burden. In practice, the federal constitutional court has to determine
that a state is in a budgetary crisis before these transfers are paid. Hitherto, two states,
Saarland and Bremen, have received these bailout transfers from 1994 until 2004, following
a ruling by the constitutional court in 1992.
3 Empirical Analysis
As argued in the introduction, a test for strategic interactions in borrowing can be used
to infer whether a cooperative federation is characterized by soft budget constraints. In
general, studies exploring ﬁscal interactions tend to focus on taxes (Devereux et al., 2008;
Edmark and Agren, 2008) and expenditures (Case et al., 1993; Baicker, 2005); studies ex-
ploring ﬁscal interactions in borrowing policies are rarer. One exception is Landon and Smith
(2000) who study for Canada how debt accumulation by the central and provincial gov-
ernments aﬀects the creditworthiness of other federation members.
3.1 Empirical model
The following model is estimated to explore the existence of vertical and horizontal strategic
interactions in subnational borrowing:
Deﬁciti,t = αWt × Deﬁciti,t + βDeﬁcit
fed
t + ζDeﬁciti,t−1 + δxi,t + γi + ρTrend + ǫi,t. (1)
In this model, Deﬁciti,t is the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i in year t, Wt × Deﬁciti,t =
 
j =i wj,tDeﬁcitj,t is the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio in year
12t, Deﬁcit
fed
t is the federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio, Deﬁciti,t−1 is the lagged deﬁcit to GDP
ratio of state i, xi,t is a vector of control variables as described further below and listed in
table 1, γi are cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects, and Trend is a time-trend.
The existence of horizontal and vertical interactions is tested with the coeﬃcient esti-
mates for α and β. If the estimate for α is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, it can be concluded
that horizontal strategic interactions in state borrowing exist. Similarly, ﬁnding that the
estimate for β is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 indicates the presence of vertical strategic
interactions.
What are the expected signs of the estimates for α and β? If soft budget constraints
exist, the direction of the vertical interactions should be negative. The reason is that if the
federal government borrows more in a given year, the amount of federal resources that will
be available in the future for a bailout of a state will be lower. Everything else equal, this
reduction in expected resources that are available for a bailout should incentivize a state i
to reduce its own borrowing.
The direction of the horizontal interactions is more diﬃcult to predict. On the one hand,
an increase in the borrowing of other states should incentivize any given state i to increase
its own borrowing because by doing so it can retain or increase its chances for a bailout
and/or reduce the likelihood that other states will get one. On the other hand, a rise in
the debt level of other states means that these states increase, ceteris paribus, their claim
on limited bailout resources. Hence, the expected amount of bailout resources available to
state i will be lower, thereby incentivizing it to reduce its own borrowing. Because of these
two countervailing eﬀects, the sign of the estimate for α is diﬃcult to predict ex-ante.
Estimating model 1 involves solving two problems (Brueckner, 2003). First, the weight
wj,t that state j has in the reaction function of state i in year t has to be determined. As
these weights cannot be estimated, they have to be imposed ex-ante. The usual procedure
is therefore to experiment with diﬀerent weighting schemes (see the next section).
13The second problem is that estimating model 1 with OLS or an analogous estimator
produces inconsistent estimates because the deﬁcits in diﬀerent states and at the federal
level are, by deﬁnition, determined simultaneously if ﬁscal interactions exist. As indicated
in the introduction, I rely on the instrumental variables approach to solve this problem. I
use the weighted average of the other states’ lagged deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the weighted
average of the other states’ population growth as instruments for the weighted average of
the other states’ contemporaneous deﬁcit to GDP ratio, Wt × Deﬁciti,t. For the federal
deﬁcit to GDP ratio, Deﬁcit
fed
t , I use a federal election year dummy and a dummy indicating
the ideology of the federal government. The federal election year dummy assumes the value
1 in years with a federal election, and else 0. The federal ideology dummy assumes the
value 1 in years with a conservative federal government (a federal government that is led
by the CDU-party), and else 0.
3.2 Weights
The weights of the other states in model 1 have to be chosen ex-ante. By convention, these
weights have the property that, ﬁrst, state i itself receives a weight of 0 and, second, that
the weights of all other states wj,t sum to 1 (i.e. they are row-normalized).
I use four diﬀerent weighting schemes. First, I give all other states the same weight.
This weighting scheme will be referred to as AVG. The weights are recalculated every year,








where Ik,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when state k exists in year t and
else 0. This implies that the weights of the eleven West-German States remain constant
at 1/10 until 1991, the year after uniﬁcation, and then fall to 1/15 as ﬁve new states were
14created after uniﬁcation. The newly formed East-German States also receive a weight of
1/15 from 1991 onward in this weighting scheme.
Second, I assign weights to each of the other states according to their population sizes.







This weighting scheme is referred to as POP. The idea behind this weighting scheme is
that the borrowing policy of a big state will impact the borrowing policy of a state i more
than that of a small state. Because the weights are recalculated every year, they reﬂect
any changes in population sizes from year to year. The population in East-Germany is
incorporated in this weighting scheme from 1991 onwards.
Third, I assign weights to the other states according to their position during horizontal
equalization. If state i is a net-recipient state in year t, all other net-recipient states in
year t are considered to aﬀect state i’s borrowing and receive the same positive weight,
whereas the net-paying states will be considered as irrelevant for its borrowing and receive
a weight of 0. Conversely, if state i is a net-paying state in t, all other net-paying states









k =i Ik,t if i and j have the same position during horizontal equalization
0 else.
(4)
Here, Ik is an indicator variable that is 1 when i and k have the same position during
horizontal equalization and 0 else. This weighting scheme is referred to as LFA I (the
acronym LFA stands for “L¨ anderﬁnanzausgleich”). It is based on the premise that states
15are particularly concerned with the borrowing policy of ﬁscally similar states. For example,
a net-recipient state might feel compelled to increase its deﬁcits if another net-recipient
state incurs a large deﬁcit in order to retain its chances for a federal bailout, but it may
be indiﬀerent to the ﬁscal policy of a net-paying state because it does not perceive it as a
competitor in the bailout game.
Fourth, I again assign weights to the other states according to their position during
horizontal equalization, but in the opposite fashion to the LFA I weights. If state i is a
net-recipient state in year t, the borrowing of all other net-recipient states in year t is
considered to be unrelated to state i’s borrowing in this weighting scheme. These states
therefore receive a weight of 0. The borrowing policy in all net-paying states, on the other
hand, is assumed to aﬀect the borrowing of state i. These states consequently receive the
same positive weight. Conversely, if state i is a net-paying state in t, all other net-paying
states in this year receive a weight of 0, whereas all net-recipient states receive the same








k =i Ik,t if i and j have diﬀerent positions during horizontal equalization
0 else.
(5)
Here, Ik is an indicator variable that is 1 when i and k have diﬀerent positions during
horizontal equalization and 0 else. This weighting scheme is referred to as LFA II. It is
based on the premise that net-paying states are particularly concerned with the borrowing
policy of net-recipient states and vice versa. For example, by incurring higher deﬁcits
themselves (or by saving less), net-paying states can lower the likelihood that net-recipient
states receive bailouts.
16Because the LFA I and LFA II weights are recalculated every year, they reﬂect any
changes in the position of a state during horizontal equalization from one year to another.
This is particularly relevant for Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. Bavaria was always
a net-recipient until 1986, then held either a neutral position or was a net-payer until 1992.
In 1992, it was for the last time in the sample period a net-recipient, thereafter it was
always a net-payer. North Rhine-Westphalia has usually assumed a net-paying or neutral
position, but received some minor amounts from horizontal equalization in the eighties
and early nineties. I therefore choose the LFA I and LFA II weights accordingly. This
means for the LFA I weights that in years where Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia
were net-recipients, I assign to them a positive weight if state i is a net-recipient and else
0. In years where they were net-payers, I assign to them a positive weight when state i is
a net-payer and else 0. I apply the opposite procedure for the LFA II weights.
In years where a state assumed a neutral position (i.e. neither payed nor received
anything during horizontal equalization), I drop it from the sample in the regressions with
the LFA weights. This eﬀectively means that such a state receives a weight of 0 in the
reaction function of the other states, i.e. its deﬁcits are assumed to be unrelated to the
deﬁcits of other states in these years. For this reason, the number of observations in the
regressions with the LFA weights is slightly smaller than in those with the AVG and POP
weights.12
3.3 Data
The dependent variable in all regressions is the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i. It is
constructed by dividing the absolute nominal change (i.e. the ﬁrst diﬀerence) in the
12Only few states have held a neutral position during the 1975-2005 period: Bavaria in 1987 and 1988,
Hamburg in 1988 and 1992; North Rhine-Westphalia in 1979, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986; and
Schleswig-Holstein in 1998. Finally, Berlin and the East-German States were not part of the horizontal
equalization scheme before 1995, instead they received either grants from the federal government or from
special funds. These observations, too, are dropped in the LFA regressions.
17capital market debt (i.e. the long-term obligations) of a state and its localities with the
nominal state GDP.
The control variables of interest are: i) the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit
to GDP ratio and ii) the federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio. As with the states’ deﬁcit to GDP
ratio, the one for the federal government is constructed by dividing the absolute change
in the capital market debt of the federal government by the nominal GDP of the whole
federation.
The debt to GDP ratio of a state i at the beginning of period t is included as a control
variable to capture the eﬀect of the debt burden on a state’s borrowing policy.
The revenue to GDP ratio is included to control for the resources a state has available.
Controlling for this ratio is important in the current context because otherwise it would be
diﬃcult to distinguish between ﬁscal interactions due to deliberate choices by state govern-
ments and a mere correlation of ﬁscal balances because of the nature of ﬁscal equalization
in Germany. For example, the equalization system ensures that a negative revenue shock
in one single state leads to a reduction in revenues in all other states as well, which might
then result in a non-deliberate increase in borrowing in all states. However, by including
a state’s revenue to GDP ratio in the model, it is possible to control for this alternative
explanation for a uniform evolution of subnational ﬁscal balances.13
Population growth is included to capture congestion and/or scale eﬀects on the budget.
The unemployment rate is included to control for business cycle eﬀects. The share of the
“young” (≤ 15 years) and the “old” (≥ 65 years) in the total population is included to
capture the eﬀect of the demographic structure of a state. Productivity growth is included
to capture how the productivity of the economy aﬀects deﬁcits.
13Note that revenues are largely predetermined from the perspective of a state because the ﬁscal con-
stitution in Germany gives the states only minuscule tax autonomy and the tax sharing rules are ﬁxed by
federal law well before the determination of the deﬁcit. Reverse causality is therefore unlikely. Nonetheless,
the models reported below were re-estimated after including the states’ revenue to GDP ratio in the set
of endogenous variables and instrumenting it with its ﬁrst lag. The results (available from the author)
regarding the existence of horizontal and vertical interactions were essentially the same.
18A dummy variable that is 1 after 1991 and 0 before is included to capture the eﬀect of
uniﬁcation. A dummy indicating whether year t is an election year in state i is included
to control for political business cycles.
State i’s number of votes in the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, is included
because states tend to trade their acceptance of certain legislation introduced by the federal
government for larger federal transfers. Thus, these votes constitute an asset that can
translate into higher revenues in the future. An increase in the number of votes might
therefore induce a state to incur higher deﬁcits.
A number of dummy variables indicating the ideology of the government are included.
During the time-frame of the analysis, German States have witnessed six diﬀerent types of
(coalition) governments. They are described in more detail in table 1. One of the ideology
dummies has to be dropped in the regressions because of perfect collinearity. I drop the
dummy indicating a sole CDU government. All estimates for the ideology variables should
therefore be interpreted relative to the CDU dummy. Around 27% of the observations are
characterized by sole CDU governments.
The interest rate on long-term government bonds is included to capture the costs of
borrowing. This variable varies over time but not over the states. It is a reasonably good
approximation of the states’ borrowing costs given that their bonds tend to be rated as well
as federal bonds. If a rating agency attaches diﬀerent ratings to state bonds, the variance
of these ratings is very small and only due to the speed with which the agency expects a
federal bailout to be administered if a state should come to face unresolvable budgetary
problems (Seitz, 1999; Rodden, 2005).
The federal debt to GDP ratio at the beginning of period t is included to capture the
eﬀect of the absolute ﬁscal position of the federal government: if the federal government
has a large debt burden, subnational governments might think it prudent to incur lower
deﬁcits.
19I also include in all regressions cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects and a time-trend. The ﬁxed
eﬀects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states. The time trend is
included instead of time dummies because the eﬀect of time dummies cannot be separately
identiﬁed from that of the weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio of the other states’ when
uniform weights are used (Devereux et al., 2008). Moreover, federal level variables cannot
be included as well when time dummies are present because of perfect multicollinearity.
That is, it would be impossible to study vertical strategic interactions.
4 Estimation and results
It is well known that estimating a model that includes a lagged dependent variable and ﬁxed
eﬀects with the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator leads to the Nickell-Bias
because the within-transformed lagged dependent variable is correlated with the trans-
formed error term (Nickell, 1981).14 However, the bias approaches 0 when the time-
dimension becomes large, i.e. the LSDV estimator is consistent for large T. The ques-
tion is then whether the time-dimension of the data at hand, which ranges from 1975 to
2005, can be considered as large enough to apply the LSDV estimator. Using simulations,
Judson and Owen (1999) report that with a time-dimension of 30 or higher, the LSDV
estimator performs well compared to the alternatives. Given that my dataset is at this
margin, I estimate model 1 ﬁrst with the LSDV estimator, but also use thereafter in section
4.2 the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
14There are several estimators available to estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model. One common alternative is
the LSDV estimator. When there are no endogenous variables, the LSDV estimator functions as follows.
First, the ﬁxed eﬀects are explicitly included in the regression. Then the model is estimated with OLS.
Other popular alternatives are the within- and ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimators. (It can be shown that the LSDV
and within-estimator are equivalent, but a degrees of freedom correction has to be applied to the standard
errors when the within-estimator is used). However, all three estimators lead to biased estimates when
a lagged dependent variable is included in the model. To deal with this problem, a number of dynamic
panel data estimators, including the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, have been developed.
20Several diagnostic tests are reported in the regression tables. Instrument validity is
tested with the Hansen-J overidentiﬁcation test. Instrument strength is tested with the
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, which is the appropriate test statistic for weak identi-
ﬁcation in the case of multiple endogenous variables and non- i.i.d. errors (most regressions
reported below exhibit heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). In addition, I also report
underidentiﬁcation tests based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic.
Finally, the presence of autocorrelation is tested with a procedure suggested by Devereux et al.
(2008). After estimating a model, the residuals are predicted. Then, the model is re-
estimated after including the ﬁrst lag of the residuals as an additional control variable. If
this variable turns out to be signiﬁcant, it is concluded that there is evidence for auto-
correlation. In the regression tables further below, the row entitled autocorrelation test
reports the p-value of the lagged residuals in the appended regressions.
4.1 LSDV estimations
The results of estimating model 1 with the LSDV estimator while using the two stage least
squares (2SLS) approach to instrument the endogenous variables are reported in table 2.
Four diﬀerent regression results are reported. They are entitled according to the weighting
scheme that is used, i.e. AVG, POP, LFA I, and LFA II.
The autocorrelation tests reported at the bottom of the table 2 provide evidence for
autocorrelation in at least three regressions. In addition, there is also evidence for het-
eroscedasticity (test results not reported). All hypothesis tests are therefore based on
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.15
The weak identiﬁcation test statistic is over 10 in all regressions. The Hansen-J test
performs well in the LFA I and LFA II regressions, in contrast to its performance in the
15Inspection of the full results (available from the author) for the appended regressions shows that
negative and not positive autocorrelation is found in these models. Not adjusting the standard errors for
autocorrelation leads to essentially the same results.
21AVG and POP regressions. Overall, the Hansen-J tests suggests that the LFA I and LFA
II results are more reliable than the AVG and POP results for this set of regressions.
The estimate for α, the eﬀect of the other states’ weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio
on state i’s deﬁcit to GDP ratio, is positive in all but the AVG regression. It is also
signiﬁcant at least at the ten percent level in the LFA I and LFA II regressions. Since the
results from the LFA I and LFA II regressions are more reliable than those from the AVG
and POP regressions according to the Hansen-J test, I conclude based on this set of results
that there is evidence for horizontal strategic interactions in subnational borrowing.
The estimates for β, the eﬀect of the federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio, is signiﬁcantly negative
for the POP regression, but insigniﬁcant for all other weighting schemes. Since the POP
regression is unreliable according to the Hansen-J test, I conclude that there is no consistent
evidence for the presence of vertical strategic interactions.
Overall, these results suggest that the borrowing behavior of German States exhibited
horizontal strategic interactions during the sample period. The numerical value of the
estimated coeﬃcients in the LFA I and LFA II regressions is around 0.47. These estimates
are large, but not implausible. In particular, they do not suggest explosive behavior.
Taking α = 0.47, it can be shown for uniform weights that an exogenous increase in the
deﬁcit to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in state i leads, after all feedback eﬀects, to a
ﬁnal increase of 1.027 percentage points in state i’s deﬁcit to GDP ratio and to an increase
of 0.057 percentage points in each of the other 15 states. Thus, the aggregated subnational
deﬁcit to GDP ratio rises by 1.882 percentage points due to an exogenous increase in the
deﬁcit to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in a state i.
4.2 Anderson-Hsiao estimations
As stated further above, one problem when estimating a dynamic model with ﬁxed eﬀects
is that the LSDV estimator is inconsistent for small T. Therefore, alternative estimation
22methods have been developed to estimate such models consistently if T is small. According
to the simulations in Judson and Owen (1999), the best alternative in the current context
is the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
This estimator can be illustrated in a nutshell as follows (Roodman, 2008). Consider
the following dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable:
yi = αyi,t−1 + δxi + νi + ǫit, (6)
where yi,t−1 is the lagged dependent variable, the xi is a vector of the remaining control
variables that can be endogenous or exogenous, and the νi are cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects.
The Anderson-Hsiao estimator starts out by applying the ﬁrst diﬀerence transformation
to model 6:
∆yi,t = α∆yi,t−1 + δ∆xi + ∆ǫit. (7)
If model 6 were a simple static ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, model 7 could be consistently
estimated with OLS (or with 2SLS if some of the variables in the x-vector are endogenous).
However, since the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the lagged dependent variable ∆yi,t−1 and the ﬁrst-
diﬀerence of the idiosyncratic error ∆ǫit are correlated, OLS would be inconsistent. Thus,
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the lagged dependent variable has to be instrumented. The variant of
the Anderson-Hsiao estimator that I use in the following instruments the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the lagged dependent variable ∆yi,t−1 with the second lag of the dependent variable yi,t−2.
The results from estimating model 1 with this Anderson-Hsiao estimator are reported in
table 3. In all regressions, I continue to use 2SLS. I instrument the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
other states’ weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the federal
government’s deﬁcit to GDP ratio with the ﬁrst diﬀerences and lags of the instruments
already used in the LSDV regressions: (i) the ﬁrst diﬀerence and the ﬁrst lag of the other
states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio (i.e. the second lag of the other states’
23weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio), (ii) the ﬁrst diﬀerence and the ﬁrst lag of the other
states’ weighted average population growth, and (iii) the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the federal
election and ideology dummies.
The signiﬁcance tests are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust stan-
dard errors. I use autocorrelation robust standard errors since there is evidence for ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation. As indicated by the second-order autocorrelation test at the bottom
of table 3, there is no evidence for second-order autocorrelation, hence the second lag of
the dependent variable is a valid instrument for the ﬁrst diﬀerence.
The Hansen-J tests are insigniﬁcant for all except the LFA I regression. The weak
identiﬁcation test statistics are larger than 10 in all but the LFA II regression. Thus, while
not perfect, the diagnostic tests do not suggest that the regressions suﬀer from common
problems and, consequently, that they are reliable, at least to the extent to which they
suggest similar conclusions.
Indeed, the results with respect to the variables of interest are reasonably similar in all
regressions and conﬁrm the conclusions from the previous section. The estimate for α is
consistently positive. It is also signiﬁcant in the AVG, POP, and LFA I regressions. The
estimate for β, on the other hand, is insigniﬁcant except in the POP regression. Thus, there
is strong evidence for the presence of horizontal strategic interactions, but little evidence
for the presence of vertical strategic interactions.
4.3 Robustness checks
The goal of this section is to explore the robustness of the results in the last sections to
the possible invalidity of the instruments through further empirical tests. As argued in the
introduction, each of the instruments might suﬀer from a speciﬁc source of endogeneity.
There might be reverse causality between the deﬁcit of a state i and other states’ population
24growth. In contrast, other states’ lagged deﬁcit, federal elections, and the ideology of the
federal government might have a direct eﬀect on state i’s deﬁcit.
In order to address the possible reverse causality between state i’s deﬁcit and other states’
population growth, I report replications of the LSDV and Anderson-Hsiao estimations in
the last sections after dropping the other states’ weighted average population growth from
the instrument set. To address the concern of a direct eﬀect of either the lagged deﬁcit
of the other states, or federal elections, or the ideology of the federal government on state
i’s deﬁcit, I report replications where each of these variables is explicitly included in the
second stage regressions. The replications of the LSDV models are reported in table 4
while those of the Anderson-Hsiao models are reported in table 5.
According to these tables, omitting the other states’ weighted average population growth
reduces the signiﬁcance of the estimate for α, especially in the LSDV estimations. While
none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in the LSDV estimations, they continue to be signif-
icantly positive for the POP and LFA II weighting scheme in the Anderson-Hsiao estima-
tions. It appears that with respect to the estimate for α, the Anderson-Hsiao estimations
are more robust to the exclusion of this instrument than the LSDV estimations. The es-
timate for β is generally insigniﬁcant (there is one exception) and thus in line with the
baseline regressions.
Including the other states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio in the second
stage regression causes the estimate for α to become signiﬁcantly positive in the AVG
and POP regressions and insigniﬁcant in the LFA II regression when the LSDV estimator
is used. However, the numerical values of the estimates for α in the AVG and POP
regressions are very large, which suggests that these models are not reliable. But the fact
that the LFA I and LFA II regressions continue to display reasonable numerical values
and remain positive is reassuring, even if the coeﬃcient turns insigniﬁcant in the LFA II
regression. With respect to the Anderson-Hsiao models, including the ﬁrst diﬀerence and
25the second lag of the weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio of the other states in the second
stage regressions reduces the signiﬁcance of the estimates for α. However, the estimates
remain consistently positive. The estimates for β are in general insigniﬁcant (there are two
exceptions) in the LSDV and Anderson-Hsiao estimations.
Including the federal election dummy in the second stage regression does not change the
results with respect to α or β in a meaningful way, neither in the LSDV nor in the Anderson-
Hsiao models. Including the federal government’s ideology in the second stage regressions
does not change the results with respect to α signiﬁcantly either. In the Anderson-Hsiao
estimations, however, it leads to signiﬁcantly negative estimates for β in the POP and the
LFA I regressions. In the LSDV estimations, the estimate for β displays a signiﬁcantly
negative coeﬃcient in the AVG and POP regressions. There is thus some, albeit weak,
evidence for the presence of vertical strategic interactions when the federal ideology dummy
is included in the second stage regression.
Overall, the main conclusion from the baseline regressions, i.e. that there were positive
horizontal interactions in the borrowing policy of German States during the sample period,
remains reasonably robust in the Anderson-Hsiao regressions. The LSDV regressions are
less robust. In particular, omitting the other states’ weighted average population growth
as instrument causes the estimates for α in the LFA I and LFA II regressions to become
insigniﬁcant.
5 Soft budget constraints vs. yardstick competition
The estimates reported in the previous section indicate that the borrowing policy of Ger-
man States displayed horizontal strategic interactions during the 1975-2005 period. Until
now, it has been implicitly assumed that soft budget constraints are the cause for these
interactions. This is indeed a likely explanation given the provisions in the German ﬁscal
26constitution. However, there is also an alternative explanation for the horizontal strate-
gic interactions: that state governments engaged in yardstick competition (Salmon, 1987;
Besley and Case, 1995). Both explanations result in the same reduced form for the econo-
metric model (Brueckner, 2003). Therefore, it is not possible to conclusively determine on
the basis of the estimates reported in the previous sections which of the two mechanisms
is responsible for the horizontal strategic interactions.
In this section, therefore, I investigate this issue further. Since expectations cannot be
measured, it is diﬃcult to directly test to what extent bailout expectations and hence
soft budget constraints drive strategic interactions. However, the yardstick competition
explanation for strategic interactions can be tested based on the following argument: If
strategic interactions are primarily driven by yardstick competition, the estimates for α
should be i) signiﬁcantly larger in election than in non-election years and ii) when the
government is formed by conservative instead of left-wing parties. The reason to expect a
larger eﬀect in election years is that if a state government believes that its electorate uses
the borrowing in other states as a yardstick for evaluating its own borrowing, the borrowing
in other states will be particularly important when an election is imminent. The reason
to expect a larger eﬀect for conservative parties is that their constituency tends to be
more critical of public borrowing. Hence, a conservative government can win favor with its
voters by running a sounder ﬁscal policy than the other states in the federation. Likewise,
it will disenchant its voters more than a left-wing government if it incurs higher deﬁcits
than other states.
To explore the election-based explanation for yardstick competition, I construct two new
variables. One is constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit
to GDP ratio with a dummy variable that is 1 in election years and 0 else; the other is
constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states deﬁcit to GDP ratio
with a dummy that is 1 in non-election years and 0 else. These new variables thus separately
27incorporate the other states’ deﬁcits in election and non-election years. I also create a new
set of instruments according to this procedure based on the old set. I then re-estimate
model 1 with these variables such that a separate eﬀect in election and non-election years
is estimated.
To explore the validity of the ideology-based explanation for yardstick competition, I
again construct two new variables. One is constructed by interacting the weighted average
of the other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio with a dummy variable that is 1 when the govern-
ment is formed by the CDU alone or a CDU-FDP coalition (these two types of governments
are usually considered to be conservative in Germany), and 0 else; the other is constructed
by interacting the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio with a dummy
that is 1 when the government is formed by a left or centrist coalition, and 0 else. As
for the election-based explanation, I also create a new set of instruments according to the
same procedure, and then use these variables to re-estimate model 1.
For brevity, I only report the coeﬃcient estimates for the weighted averages of the other
states in table 6 (the full results are available from the author). Whether or not the
estimates are larger for election years or, respectively, under a conservative government
than in non-election years or, respectively, under a non-conservative government, can be
tested with a t-test. Hence, I also report the p-value of a t-test on the equality of each of
the two coeﬃcients in these tables.
The t-tests show that the estimated coeﬃcients for election and non-election years and
those for conservative and non-conservative governments are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
This indicates that yardstick competition is not the reason for the horizontal strategic
interactions, thereby suggesting that soft budget constraints are the underlying cause for
the horizontal interactions in subnational borrowing.
286 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore whether the German States face soft budget con-
straints by testing for strategic interactions in state borrowing with panel data covering the
1975-2005 period. In the empirical analysis, I found evidence pointing toward the existence
of horizontal strategic interactions, but no evidence for vertical strategic interactions. With
regard to the horizontal interactions, tests indicated that they were not due to yardstick
competition. Soft budget constraints were hence identiﬁed as the most likely explanation
for the horizontal interactions.
The fact that subnational borrowing in Germany was characterized by horizontal strate-
gic interactions indicates that state governments believed that there was the distinct pos-
sibility of a bailout during the 1975-2005 period. The ﬁnding that there were no vertical
strategic interactions indicates that subnational governments have disregarded the bor-
rowing of the federal government during the time-frame of the analysis. In conjunction
with the fact that the direction of the horizontal interactions is positive, this suggests that
subnational governments were mostly concerned with the likelihood of receiving a bailout
and less concerned about its amount– apparently, state governments did not believe that
the federal ﬁscal commons would be exhausted in a signiﬁcant way by federal borrowing
or by bailout transfers paid to other states.
This paper hence supports the notion that the ﬁscal constitution that prevailed in Ger-
many during the 1975-2005 period led to a systematic upward-ratcheting of subnational
debt. The necessity of a reform of the federal ﬁscal constitution and its cooperative el-
ements, in particular the intergovernmental transfer scheme, has indeed been recognized
by policy makers, and this issue was part of the negotiations that were begun in 2005
on the wider “F¨ oderalismusreform” (the reform of federalism in Germany). However, no
agreement could be reached in these negotiations with respect to the intergovernmental
29transfer scheme and it was decided to continue with the current system at least until 2019.
Instead of a reform of the transfer scheme, a new borrowing rule was introduced for both
the federal and state governments in the hope that it will be more eﬀective in limiting the
growth of debt at all tiers of government than the existing one. It will be interesting to
observe how this so called “debt brake” will aﬀect subnational soft budget constraints in
the coming years.
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34Figure 1: Debt to GDP ratio of the state tier in Germany, 1975-2005
Figure 2: Mean deficit to GDP ratio in German States 1975-2005. The State
codes are defined as follows: BAY (Bavaria), BB (Brandenburg), BER (Berlin), BW (Baden-
Wuerttemberg) HB (Bremen), HE (Hesse), HH (Hamburg), MV (Mecklenburg-Western Pomera-
nia), NDS (Lower-Saxony), NRW (North Rhine-Westphalia), RP (Rhineland-Palatinate), SAAR
(Saarland) SH (Schleswig-Holstein ), SN (Saxony), ST (Saxony-Anhalt), TH (Thuringia)
Figure 3: Deficit to GDP ratio in German States 1975-2005Table 1: Definition and source of variables
Label Description Source
Deﬁcit to GDP ratio State deﬁcit/GDP ratio German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Deﬁcit to GDP ratio of other
states
Weighted average of other states’ deﬁcit/GDP ra-
tios
German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio Deﬁcit/GDP ratio of the federal government German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Debt to GDP ratio State debt/GDP ratio at beginning of period t German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Revenue to GDP ratio State revenue/GDP ratio German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Population growth State population growth German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Unemployment State unemployment rate German Federal Agency of
Employment
Population share of young Share of “young” (≤15 years) in state population German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Population share of old Share of “old” (≥65 years) in state population German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁce
Productivity growth State productivity growth (growth of real GDP per
Worker)
Federal and State Statistical
Oﬃces (Arbeitskreis VGR der
L¨ ander)
Votes in Bundesrat State votes in second chamber of parliament Pitlik et al. (2005) and own
calculations
Uniﬁcation Dummy=1 if year ≥ 1991 Own calculations
Election year Dummy = 1 if state election year Own calculations based on
www.bundeswahlleiter.de
SPD Dummy = 1 if state government formed by SPD
only
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-Green Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
Green party coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-FDP Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
FDP coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
CDU-SPD Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by
CDU-SPD coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
CDU-FDP Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by
CDU-FDP coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-Green-FDP Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
Green party-FDP coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
SPD-PDS Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by SPD-
PDS coalition
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
CDU Dummy = 1 if state government is formed by CDU
only
Own calculations based on
www.election.de
Interest rate Interest on long-term government bonds OECD
Federal debt Federal debt/GDP ratio at beginning of period t German Federal Statistical Of-
ﬁceTable 2: Horizontal and vertical interactions in subna-
tional borrowing, German states, 1975-2005, Least
squares dummy variable estimations
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deﬁcit to GDP ratio of other states -0.034 0.286 0.467** 0.483*
(-0.096) (0.827) (2.185) (1.734)
Federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio -0.108 -0.128* 0.041 0.095
(-1.102) (-1.685) (0.387) (0.971)
N 369 369 345 345
F 110.230 110.399 57.059 54.050
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.019 0.010 0.511 0.526
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.008
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.923 26.294 20.668 27.468
Autocorr.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.112 0.087
a The dependent variable is the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i, the independent variables of
interest are the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the federal
government’s deﬁcit to GDP ratio.
b The instruments are: other states’ weighted average population growth, lagged weighted average
of other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio, federal election year dummy, federal ideology dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i.e. AVG
refers to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where
states that are ﬁscally similar to state i receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting
scheme where ﬁscally dissimilar states receive a positive weight.
d Control variables whose results are omitted (full results can be found in table A.1 in the ap-
pendix): Deﬁcit to GDP ratiot−1, Debt to GDP ratio, Revenue to GDP ratio, Population
growth, Unemployment rate, Population share of young, Population share of old, Productiv-
ity growth, Votes in Bundesrat, Uniﬁcation, Election year, SPD-Green-FDP dummy, SPD
dummy, SPD-PDS dummy, SPD-Green dummy, SPD-FDP dummy, CDU-SPD dummy, CDU-
FDP dummy, Interest rate, Federal debt, Trend.
e Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
f t-statistics in parentheses.
g t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
h State ﬁxed eﬀects and time trend included in all models.
i The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identiﬁcation.Table 3: Horizontal and vertical interactions in sub-
national borrowing, German states, 1975-2005,
Anderson-Hsiao estimations
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deﬁcit of other states 0.393* 0.379** 0.256* 0.295
(1.843) (2.283) (1.708) (1.322)
Federal deﬁcit -0.001 -0.118*** -0.126 0.027
(-0.014) (-2.721) (-1.539) (0.411)
N 353 353 342 342
F 5.573 14.005 6.626 8.292
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.314 0.459 0.037 0.133
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.595 117.803 15.966 2.867
First-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.005 0.045 0.001 0.012
Second-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.569 0.604 0.417 0.530
a The dependent variable is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i, the inde-
pendent variables of interest are the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the weighted average of the other states’
deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the federal government’s deﬁcit to GDP ratio.
b The instruments are: ﬁrst diﬀerence of other states’ weighted average population growth, ﬁrst
lag of other states’ weighted average population growth, ﬁrst diﬀerence of lagged weighted
average of other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio, second lag of other states’ weighted average deﬁcit
to GDP ratio, ﬁrst diﬀerence of federal election year dummy, ﬁrst diﬀerence of federal ideology
dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i.e. AVG
refers to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where
ﬁscally similar states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where
ﬁscally dissimilar states receive a positive weight.
d Control variables whose results are omitted (full results can be found in table A.2 in the
appendix): Deﬁcit to GDP ratiot−1, Debt to GDP ratio, Revenue to GDP ratio, Popula-
tion growth, Unemployment, Population share of young, Population share of old, Productiv-
ity growth, Votes in Bundesrat, Uniﬁcation, Election year, SPD-Green-FDP dummy, SPD
dummy, SPD-PDS dummy, SPD-Green dummy, SPD-FDP dummy, CDU-SPD dummy, CDU-
FDP dummy, Interest rate, Federal debt, Trend. All control variables are included in ﬁrst
diﬀerences.
e Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
f t-statistics in parentheses.
g t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
h State ﬁxed eﬀects and time trend included in all models.
i The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identiﬁcation.Table 4: Strategic interactions in subnational borrowing, German states,
1975-2005, Least squares dummy variable estimations, Robustness
checks for instrument validity
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Omitting other states’ population growth
Deﬁcit of other states -0.744 -0.452 0.394 0.475
(-1.429) (-0.991) (0.860) (1.368)
Federal deﬁcit 0.176 0.052 0.048 0.095
(1.115) (0.516) (0.384) (0.954)
Other states’ lagged deﬁcit to GDP ratio in second stage regressions
Deﬁcit of other states 3.235* 2.970*** 0.543* 0.439
(1.836) (2.918) (1.785) (1.131)
Federal deﬁcit -0.393** -0.102 0.008 0.105
(-2.235) (-1.052) (0.070) (0.835)
Lag of other states’ deﬁcit -0.903** -1.127*** -0.040 0.019
(-1.998) (-2.837) (-0.261) (0.153)
Federal election dummy in second stage regressions
Deﬁcit of other states 0.032 0.296 0.464** 0.499*
(0.093) (0.858) (2.185) (1.766)
Federal deﬁcit -0.134 -0.140* 0.047 0.100
(-1.439) (-1.849) (0.453) (1.010)
Federal election -0.101 -0.098 0.046 0.071
(-1.307) (-1.187) (0.801) (1.013)
Federal government’s ideology in second stage regressions
Deﬁcit of other states -0.075 0.378 0.466** 0.505*
(-0.229) (1.108) (2.268) (1.780)
Federal deﬁcit -0.278** -0.334*** 0.036 0.044
(-2.272) (-2.841) (0.174) (0.370)
Ideology federal government 0.495** 0.501*** 0.012 0.130
(2.550) (2.722) (0.031) (0.537)
Note: This table presents LSDV estimation results for models where (i) other states’ weighted average population growth is
dropped from the instrument set, (ii) other states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio is included in the second
stage regression, (iii) the federal election dummy is included in the second stage regression, and (iv) the dummy indicating the
ideology of the federal government is included in the second stage regression. For further notes, see table 2.Table 5: Strategic interactions in subnational borrowing, German states,
1975-2005, Anderson-Hsiao estimations, Robustness checks for instru-
ment validity
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Omitting other states’ population growth
Deﬁcit of other states 0.454 0.423** 0.210 0.557*
(1.556) (2.068) (1.521) (1.783)
Federal deﬁcit 0.026 -0.120*** -0.096 -0.065
(0.351) (-2.774) (-0.917) (-0.592)
Other states’ lagged deﬁcit to GDP ratio in second stage regressions
Deﬁcit of other states 1.060 0.492 1.232* 0.094
(1.395) (0.875) (1.755) (0.340)
Federal deﬁcit -0.097 -0.064 -0.259* 0.060
(-0.678) (-0.508) (-1.852) (0.820)
Lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence of other states’ deﬁcit 0.403 -0.201 0.582** 0.091
(1.350) (-0.497) (2.446) (1.142)
Second lag of other states’ deﬁcit 0.550 -0.258 0.500 -0.029
(0.917) (-0.991) (1.439) (-0.388)
Federal election dummy in second stage regressions
Deﬁcit of other states 0.357* 0.375** 0.271 0.333
(1.712) (2.154) (1.575) (1.491)
Federal deﬁcit -0.013 -0.133*** -0.175 0.055
(-0.230) (-2.617) (-1.588) (0.642)
Federal election -0.026 -0.080 -0.064 0.041
(-0.479) (-1.314) (-0.915) (0.798)
Federal government’s ideology in second stage regressions
Deﬁcit of other states 0.368 0.357** 0.239 0.240
(1.615) (2.113) (1.521) (0.958)
Federal deﬁcit -0.008 -0.118*** -0.134* 0.021
(-0.125) (-2.762) (-1.705) (0.344)
Ideology federal government 0.094 0.125 0.159 0.098
(0.529) (0.794) (1.027) (0.642)
Note: This table presents Anderson-Hsiao estimation results for models where (i) other states’ weighted average population
growth is dropped from the instrument set, (ii) other states’ lagged weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio is included in the
second stage regression (both the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence and the second lag of the level), (iii) the federal election dummy is
included in the second stage regression, and (iv) the dummy indicating the ideology of the federal government is included in
the second stage regression. For further notes, see table 3.Table 6: Soft budget constraints vs. yardstick competition
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Election yes Deﬁcit of other states -0.403 -0.075 0.341* 0.336
(-0.907) (-0.181) (1.734) (1.164)
no Deﬁcit of other states 0.130 0.499 0.538** 0.460*
(0.369) (1.219) (2.215) (1.749)
t-test (p-value) 0.141 0.193 0.286 0.611
Conservative yes Deﬁcit of other states 0.194 0.364 0.413* 0.427
(0.434) (0.741) (1.676) (1.481)
no Deﬁcit of other states -0.058 0.245 0.427 0.380
(-0.163) (0.643) (1.493) (1.229)
t-test (p-value) 0.551 0.822 0.966 0.881
Notes: See table 2.Appendix
Table A.1: Horizontal and vertical interactions in subnational borrowing,
German states, 1975-2005, Least squares dummy variable estima-
tions
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deﬁcit to GDP ratio of other states -0.034 0.286 0.467** 0.483*
(-0.096) (0.827) (2.185) (1.734)
Federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio -0.108 -0.128* 0.041 0.095
(-1.102) (-1.685) (0.387) (0.971)
Deﬁcit to GDP ratiot−1 0.403*** 0.392*** 0.308*** 0.325***
(8.223) (8.681) (4.868) (6.124)
Debt to GDP ratio -6.504** -5.681** -1.744 -1.328
(-2.196) (-1.994) (-0.648) (-0.587)
Revenue to GDP ratio -13.017* -12.218 -27.200*** -25.616***
(-1.729) (-1.523) (-3.337) (-3.432)
Population growth -0.195* -0.124 0.005 0.007
(-1.840) (-1.078) (0.040) (0.047)
Unemployment 0.176** 0.140** 0.003 -0.006
(2.293) (2.146) (0.063) (-0.114)
Population share of young 33.796*** 30.680*** 13.473* 11.304
(3.997) (3.437) (1.912) (1.625)
Population share of old -12.599* -15.400** -25.030*** -21.720**
(-1.890) (-2.105) (-2.648) (-2.566)
Productivity growth 0.004 0.028 -0.080** -0.096***
(0.127) (0.890) (-2.484) (-2.609)
Votes in Bundesrat -0.079 -0.033 0.318 0.091
(-0.423) (-0.195) (1.389) (0.488)
Uniﬁcation -0.926* -1.227*** -1.231*** -1.151***
(-1.758) (-2.731) (-3.584) (-3.090)
Election year 0.112 0.131 0.051 0.053
(0.782) (0.984) (0.546) (0.530)
SPD-Green-FDP 0.499 0.443 -0.506 -0.624*
(0.627) (0.525) (-1.379) (-1.823)
SPD 0.324* 0.340** 0.083 0.110
(1.917) (2.055) (0.434) (0.544)
SPD-PDS 0.885 0.878 0.060 0.025
(1.108) (1.129) (0.074) (0.028)
42SPD-Green 0.574*** 0.579*** 0.359* 0.393**
(3.173) (3.248) (1.925) (2.034)
SPD-FDP 0.358 0.398** 0.389* 0.343
(1.634) (2.063) (1.772) (1.541)
CDU-SPD -0.202 -0.179 -0.187 -0.074
(-1.062) (-0.935) (-0.943) (-0.318)
CDU-FDP 0.141 0.152 -0.030 0.039
(0.938) (1.032) (-0.295) (0.307)
Interest rate 0.210*** 0.164** 0.021 -0.013
(3.481) (2.021) (0.343) (-0.168)
Federal debt -19.787*** -15.997*** -5.551 -4.943
(-2.872) (-3.037) (-1.228) (-1.263)
Trend 0.286*** 0.258*** 0.095** 0.078*
(4.648) (4.822) (1.975) (1.831)
N 369 369 345 345
F 110.230 110.399 57.059 54.050
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.019 0.010 0.511 0.526
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.008
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.923 26.294 20.668 27.468
Autocorr.-test (p-val.) 0.004 0.002 0.112 0.087
a The dependent variable is the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i; the independent variables of interest
are the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio and the federal government’s deﬁcit
to GDP ratio; the various combinations of the party dummy variables (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green,
PDS) indicate the ruling coalition in state i.
b The instruments are: other states’ weighted average population growth, lagged weighted average of
other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio, federal election year dummy, federal ideology dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i.e. AVG refers
to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where ﬁscally similar
states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where ﬁscally dissimilar states
receive a positive weight.
d Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
e t-statistics in parentheses.
f t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
g State ﬁxed eﬀects and time trend included in all models.
h The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identiﬁcation.
43Table A.2: Strategic interactions in subnational borrowing, German
states, 1975-2005, Anderson-Hsiao estimations
AVG POP LFA I LFA II
b/t b/t b/t b/t
Deﬁcit to GDP ratio of other states 0.393* 0.379** 0.256* 0.295
(1.843) (2.283) (1.708) (1.322)
Federal deﬁcit to GDP ratio -0.001 -0.118*** -0.126 0.027
(-0.014) (-2.721) (-1.539) (0.411)
Deﬁcit to GDP ratiot−1 -0.059 -0.112** -0.112** -0.070
(-0.970) (-2.065) (-2.035) (-1.392)
Debt to GDP ratio -35.151*** -34.370*** -31.113*** -34.597***
(-5.634) (-3.933) (-3.914) (-3.544)
Revenue to GDP ratio -21.936** -22.964** -32.733*** -31.768***
(-2.119) (-2.082) (-3.260) (-2.968)
Population growth 0.044 0.081 -0.013 0.049
(0.412) (0.657) (-0.121) (0.393)
Unemployment 0.104 0.060 0.166** 0.149**
(1.288) (0.657) (2.480) (2.335)
Population share of young -30.054* -21.633 -13.510 -24.401
(-1.949) (-1.152) (-0.844) (-1.502)
Population share of old 15.930 8.336 -2.529 8.067
(0.868) (0.565) (-0.162) (0.544)
Productivity growth 0.049 0.034 0.004 0.020
(1.438) (1.143) (0.131) (0.510)
Votes in Bundesrat 0.072 0.134 0.013 0.006
(0.251) (0.534) (0.048) (0.020)
Uniﬁcation -0.127 -0.106 -0.141 -0.076
(-0.455) (-0.475) (-0.574) (-0.328)
Election 0.099 0.088 0.091 0.085
(1.392) (1.177) (1.278) (1.204)
SPD-Green-FDP 0.697 0.620 1.151 1.656*
(0.980) (1.004) (1.505) (1.670)
SPD 0.339 0.255 0.382 0.374
(1.229) (0.978) (1.315) (1.577)
SPD-PDS 1.160 1.378 1.123 0.974
(0.800) (1.083) (0.958) (0.920)
SPD-Green 0.202 0.235 0.181 0.142
(0.777) (1.071) (0.853) (0.616)
SPD-FDP 0.563 0.484 0.704** 0.744**
(1.564) (1.564) (2.228) (2.361)
44CDU-SPD -0.417 -0.298 -0.358 -0.553*
(-0.948) (-0.818) (-0.991) (-1.878)
CDU-FDP -0.009 -0.054 0.054 0.159
(-0.043) (-0.265) (0.269) (0.735)
Interest rate -0.014 -0.005 0.029 -0.039
(-0.196) (-0.063) (0.405) (-0.533)
Federal debt 2.726 -15.706** -11.797 0.932
(0.335) (-2.569) (-1.601) (0.143)
Trend -0.036 -0.300 0.114 -0.030
(-0.319) (-1.440) (1.163) (-0.400)
N 353 353 342 342
F 5.573 14.005 6.626 8.292
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.314 0.459 0.037 0.133
Underid.-test (p-val.) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.595 117.803 15.966 2.867
First-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.005 0.045 0.001 0.012
Second-order autocorr. (p-val.) 0.569 0.604 0.417 0.530
a The dependent variable is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the deﬁcit to GDP ratio of state i, the independent
variables of interest are the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the weighted average of the other states’ deﬁcit to
GDP ratio and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the federal government’s deﬁcit to GDP ratio; the various
combinations of the party dummy variables (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green, PDS) indicate the ruling
coalition in state i.
b The instruments are: ﬁrst diﬀerence of other states’ weighted average population growth, ﬁrst lag
of other states’ weighted average population growth, ﬁrst diﬀerence of lagged weighted average of
other states’ deﬁcit to GDP ratio, second lag of other states’ weighted average deﬁcit to GDP ratio,
ﬁrst diﬀerence of federal election year dummy, ﬁrst diﬀerence of federal ideology dummy.
c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i.e. AVG refers
to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where ﬁscally similar
states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where ﬁscally dissimilar states
receive a positive weight.
d Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
e t-statistics in parentheses.
f t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
g State ﬁxed eﬀects and time trend included in all models.
h The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identiﬁcation.
45Table A.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Variance Mean SD Min Max Obs.
Deﬁcit of other
states
overall 1.63 1.71 -3.48 10.97 369
between 1.21 0.42 4.53 16
within 1.37 -4.09 9.51 23.06
Federal deﬁcit overall 1.96 1.58 -0.83 7.79 369
between 0.03 1.93 2.05 16
within 1.58 -0.92 7.81 23.06
Debt overall 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.69 369
between 0.08 0.10 0.38 16
within 0.06 0.02 0.56 23.06
Revenues overall 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.32 369
between 0.05 0.14 0.27 16
within 0.02 0.13 0.24 23.06
Population growth overall 0.08 0.68 -2.23 2.09 369
between 0.47 -0.96 0.56 16
within 0.54 -2.47 2.06 23.06
Unemployment overall 10.83 4.91 2.10 22.10 369
between 5.09 5.49 20.28 16
within 2.30 2.98 16.38 23.06
Population share of
young
overall 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.23 369
between 0.01 0.14 0.18 16
within 0.02 0.12 0.22 23.06
Population share of
old
overall 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.22 369
between 0.01 0.15 0.19 16
within 0.01 0.13 0.21 23.06
Productivity
growth
overall 1.64 2.41 -3.14 16.17 369
between 1.39 0.53 4.12 16
within 2.14 -2.95 13.68 23.06
Votes in Bundesrat overall 4.23 1.02 3.00 6.00 369
between 0.93 3.00 5.52 16
within 0.31 3.72 4.89 23.06
Uniﬁcation overall 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.24 0.52 1.00 16
within 0.44 0.10 1.10 23.06
Election year overall 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.03 0.21 0.31 16
within 0.43 -0.07 1.03 23.06
46SPD-Green-FDP overall 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.04 0.00 0.15 16
within 0.11 -0.14 0.91 23.06
SPD overall 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.23 0.00 0.59 16
within 0.37 -0.34 1.15 23.06
SPD-PDS overall 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.15 0.00 0.54 16
within 0.13 -0.51 0.74 23.06
SPD-Green overall 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.13 0.00 0.31 16
within 0.27 -0.21 0.97 23.06
SPD-FDP overall 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.14 0.00 0.52 16
within 0.22 -0.44 0.97 23.06
CDU-SPD overall 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.22 0.00 0.71 16
within 0.26 -0.60 1.08 23.06
CDU-FDP overall 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 369
between 0.15 0.00 0.46 16
within 0.32 -0.32 1.10 23.06
Interest rate overall 6.29 1.67 3.35 10.24 369
between 0.68 5.19 6.58 16
within 1.57 3.06 9.95 23.06
Federal debt overall 0.28 0.09 0.11 0.39 369
between 0.04 0.26 0.35 16
within 0.08 0.13 0.41 23.06
a) Summary statistics are based on the observations used in the regressions
b) The deﬁcit of other states and federal deﬁcit variables are percentage points (percentages multiplied by 100),
the other ﬁscal ratios (debt, revenues, federal debt) are percentages.
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